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This paper is concerned primarily with the economic and welfare consequences of federal 
redistributive grants.  We use a model which has two regions, each with households, 
firms and regional governments as well as a federal government.  The households, firms 
and regional governments are all optimizers – households maximize utility, firms 
maximize profits and we assume that regional governments are empire-builders in that 
they choose their expenditure and tax levels so as to maximise total expenditure – the size 
of their empire. Labour is free to move between regions in response to utility differences 
and does so until such differences have been eliminated.  Inter-regional migration, inter-
regional trade flows and federal government redistribution are the main sources of 
interconnectedness between the two regions.  The model is linearised in log-differences 
and simulated using a calibration based on Australian state-level data.  We find that the 
welfare effect of intergovernmental transfers is trivial but that all other variables of 
interest change substantially – consumption, employment, prices, taxes, wages, output 
and government expenditure.  Finally, the signs of the effects of a federal transfer are not 
affected by the empire-building behaviour of regional governments although the 
magnitude of the effects is generally dampened.  
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1.  Introduction 
A common feature of the older federal systems such as the United States, Canada and 
Australia is that the federal government adopts an inter-regional redistributive role.  In the 
case of the Australian federation, for example, the federal government taxes the six states 
(the members of the federation) uniformly.  From its tax collections it then makes an 
annual grant to each of the six state governments.  These annual grants, however, are not 
uniform; the states which suffer most from revenue-raising and cost disabilities get the 
largest grants in per capita terms.  The federal government’s system of annual grants is, 
therefore, redistributive in its effect as between the six states. 
 
Of the economic questions which arise in connection with such federal redistributive 
grants possibly the most prominent are questions relating to the way in which the size of 
the grants should be fixed and questions concerned with their economic and welfare 
consequences.  Both types of question have been widely discussed in the fiscal-federalism 
literature. 
 
Studies which examine questions of the first type include Boadway and Keen (1997) and 
Petchey (1995) in both of which the issue is how the federal government should proceed 
if it wishes to determine the grants optimally.  Studies in which the focus is on effects 
include the North American studies of Boadway and Flatters (1982), Boadway (1985), 
Cornes and Sandler (1986), Myers (1990) and Winer and Gauthier (1982) and the   
Australian studies of Petchey (1992), Swan and Garvey (1992), Petchey (1993), Petchey 
and Walsh (1993), Petchey (1995), Petchey and Shapiro (2000, 2002), Groenewold, 
Hagger and Madden (2000, 2003) and Dixon et al. (2002). 
 
The present study belongs with the second group to the extent that it, too, is concerned 
primarily with the economic and welfare consequences of federal redistributive grants.  It 
differs from them, however, in two important ways.  The first relates to the procedure 
used to develop the modelling framework for the study.  The second concerns the way in 
which the conclusions about economic and welfare effects which the model implies are 
drawn.  In the present study these conclusions are generated by numerical simulations 
resembling those which are to be found in studies based on CGE modelling. 
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In developing our modelling framework we adopted a two-stage approach.  We began 
with a model from a class which has played an important part in the fiscal-federalism 
literature generally and in studies concerned with the effects of redistributive federal 
grants, in particular.  We refer to models of multi-regional federations with a given freely-
mobile supply of labour.  In these models labour is allowed to migrate costlessly between 
regions in search of maximum welfare and they typically impose, as an equilibrium 
condition, that the utility of the representative household be the same in all regions.  A 
mobility model of this type is to be found in several of the studies focussing on the effects 
of redistributive grants just referred to - those of Boadway and Flatters (1982), Myers 
(1990), Petchey (1995), Petchey and Shapiro (2000) and Groenewold, Hagger and 
Madden (2000). 
 
The model which formed our starting point has two regions, each with households, firms 
and governments.  The households and firms are optimizers but the governments are not; 
the fiscal decisions of the regional governments and the federal government are treated as 
exogenous, although subject to a budget constraint.  Since the model is essentially 
Walrasian in character we refer to it as the GE (general equilibrium) component of the 
modelling framework. 
 
The GE model has two sources of interconnectedness between the regions apart from  
inter-regional migration.  The first is the redistribution carried out by the federal 
government. The second is inter-regional trade in goods.  It is assumed that he firms in 
each region supply output not only to households and government in their own region but 
also to households in the other region.  
 
We abstract from all other inter-regional effects.  For example, we exclude spillover 
effects in the provision of government goods; we assume that each regional government 
supplies the government good only to households living in its own region.  Again, we 
assume that each firm in region 1 is owned only by households of region 1 and similarly 
for region 2. 
 
The second step in developing our modelling framework was to extend the GE model by 
making the two regional governments behave in an optimizing way.  There are various 
ways in which this may be achieved.  The most common is to assume that regional   4
governments are beneficent in that they choose their tax and expenditure levels so as to 
maximise the utility of their citizens subject to the constraints imposed by the structure of 
the economy.  Such an approach has been used in, e.g. Petchey (1993), Petchey and 
Shapiro (2000, 2002) and Groenewold, Hagger and Madden (2000, 2003). An alternative 
which we follow in this paper is to assume that regional governments are empire-builders 
in that they choose their expenditure and tax levels so as to maximise total expenditure – 
the size of their empire.  We find this an interesting and plausible alternative – many 
would argue that it is more plausible than the beneficent alternative.  Each regional 
government is therefore assumed to make its fiscal decisions so as to maximize its total 
expenditure, subject to the constraints imposed by its budget constraint and the structure 
of its economy, as depicted in the GE model.  In carrying out its maximization process 
each regional government takes the fiscal decisions of the other as given.  In effect, 
therefore, the two governments are engaged in a non-cooperative strategic game with a 
Nash equilibrium as the outcome. 
 
We refer to the model which finally emerged from this two-stage procedure as the PEGE 
(political-economy GE) model.  The PEGE model is highly non-linear.  For this reason it 
cannot be solved analytically and so cannot be used, as it stands, to address the question 
with which the paper is concerned - the economic and welfare effects of federal 
redistributive grants.  We get round this difficulty by using a process of log-
differentiation to linearise the model which is then calibrated from Australia data and 
used to simulate the effects on a range of variables in each of the two regions of a federal 
government transfer shock. 
 
Numerical simulations are open to the justified criticism that the results depend on the 
calibration used and we counter this by conducting a number of simulations; in particular, 
six simulations were conducted.  In the first simulation New South Wales was region 1, 
the region to which the transfer is made and the rest of the country  region 2, the region 
from which the transfer is made.  In the second simulation Victoria was the recipient 
region and the rest of the country the donor region; and so on for each of the other four 
states (Queensland, South Australia, Western Australia and Tasmania).   
 
Several important conclusions on the efficiency question emerge from these simulations. 
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The possibility that federal redistributive grants might be efficient, Pareto-wise or in some 
other sense, was recognized in North American studies in the early 1990s.  (A survey of 
this literature is given in Petchey and Walsh, 1993).  But not until Petchey (1995) was the 
efficiency question systematically examined in an Australian setting.  Using a two-region 
model of the labour-mobility type (a model without regional governments) he confirmed 
the efficiency possibility and pointed to the conditions under which it might be realized. 
 
With the help of our six simulations we have been able to take the matter a good deal 
further.  In the first place the cases in which a transfer is Pareto-improving and those in 
which it is not, have been identified.  The Pareto-improving cases are those in which the 
recipient regions are New South Wales, Victoria and Western Australia.  Here households 
are better-off in both regions because of the transfer.  In the remaining cases households 
are worse-off in both regions. 
 
Secondly, we have been able to show that in all of the three cases of Pareto-improvement 
the welfare gains are trivial and that the same is true of the welfare losses in the 
remaining cases. 
 
Finally, the simulations make it clear that, while welfare is unaffected for all practical 
purposes, all other variable of interest change substantially – consumption, employment, 
taxes, prices, wages, output and government expenditure.  Households manage to offset 
the effects of these changes on welfare, however, by migrating from one region to the 
other.  Thus, the federal government transfers effect substantial changes in regional 
economies but without changing welfare.  A comparison of PEGE and GE versions of the 
model shows that the effect of empire-building regional governments in the process of 
adjustment to a federal transfer is to dampen the magnitude of the changes resulting from 
the transfer but to leave the direction of these changes largely unaffected.  
 
The rest of the paper consists of five main sections.  In section 2 we begin by building the 
small two-region GE model.  As mentioned already this model has optimizing private 
agents but not optimizing governments; government fiscal decisions are simply treated as 
exogenous.  We then extend this two-region GE model by making the two regional 
governments behave in an empire-building way.  The result is the PEGE model.  This 
model is linearized in section 3, calibrated in section 4 and put to work in section 5.  We   6
simulate the model by introducing a federal-government transfer shock.  We do this for 
each of the six states in turn, in each case treating the rest of the country as the second 
region.  The results of these simulations are then used to generate conclusions about the 
effects (both direct and indirect) of inter-regional federal transfers in a regime of 
optimizing regional governments.  In the final section of the paper the major conclusions 
are dealt with in detail.   
 
2.  The Two-Region PEGE Model 
We begin by setting out the two-region GE model which forms the core of the PEGE 
model. 
2.1  The Two-Region GE Model 
Each region consists of households, firms and a regional government.  In addition there is 
a single federal government.  We describe the behaviour of each of these agents in turn 
before specifying the equilibrium conditions. 
 
2.1.1  The Representative Household 
There are two goods in the model, one produced in region 1 and the other in region 2.  
We assume that the households in each region consumer both of the goods.   
 
We use the following explicit utility function for the representative household in region i:   
(1) 
1 2i i δ
i1 i 2 i i UC C G
i
i
γ γ β = ,    i = 1, 2 
where Ui =  utility,  region  i, 
 C 1i  =  real private consumption of good 1 per household, region i, 
 C 2i  =  real private consumption of good 2 per household, region i, 
 G i  =  real government-provided consumption per household, region i. 
  0 i > β  
 0  <  γ1i < 1 
 0  <  γ2i < 1 
 0  <  δi < 1 
  γ1i + γ2i + δi  = 1   7
We assume that inter-regional trade is free and costless and, therefore, that the single 
good produced in region 1 sells at the same price in both regions and that the price of the 
good produced in region 2 sells at the same price in both regions.  On this assumption and 
the further assumption that there is no saving in the model, the representative household  
in region i has a budget constraint of the form: 
  11 i 22 i i PC PC M += ,  i = 1,2 
where Pi  =  price of the consumption good i produced in region i, 
 M i  =  nominal income per household, region i. 
On the assumption that each household supplies one unit of labour so that labour income 
per household is equal to the wage rate, Mi is given by: 
(2)  ii i MH W =Π + ,  i = 1,2 
where  i H Π  =  nominal profit distribution per household, region i, 
 W i    =    nominal wage, region i. 
The representative household in region i is assumed to choose C1i and C2i (while taking 
Gi, ΠHi, and Wi as given) so as to maximise (1) subject to its budget constraint.  This 
implies demand functions of the form: 
(3)  ji ji i i j C ( /(1- ))(M /P ) γδ = ,     i,j = 1,2 
 
2.1.2 The Representative Firm 
We assume that there are Li households in region i.  Since we have already assumed that 
each household  supplies one unit of labour, Li is also the labour supply of region i.  
Further, if full employment is assumed, Li will also be employment in region i. 
 
We assume that there are Ni firms in region i.  Ni is treated as exogenous.  We assume 
that each firm in region i operates with a production function which has a positive but  
declining marginal product of the single factor, labour.  This means that all firms in 
region i will be of the same size and hence that output, Yi, for the representative firm in 
region i is given by: 
















The representative firm is assumed to operate in perfectly competitive output and labour 
markets and accordingly chooses employment to maximise profit:   8
(5)  ()
i
ii i i i
i
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 i  =  1,2 
subject to the production function (4) with Pi and Wi taken as given.  In (5) ΠFi denotes 
profit per firm in region i and Ti the payroll tax rate imposed by region i’s government.  
Substituting (4) into (5) and maximising with respect to Li we get the single first-order 
condition: 




















 i  =  1,2 
This is the standard marginal productivity condition adjusted for the presence of the 
payroll tax. 
 
2.1.3 The Regional Government 
The government of region i purchases output from firms in region i and receives revenue 
from the payroll tax levied in region i.  The amount of output purchased is GRi per 
household or a total of LiGRi.  Total tax revenue is TiWiLi.  We assume that the 
government of region i balances its budget so that: 
  i i i i i L W T GR L =  
or 
(7)  i i i W T GR =  i  =  1,2 
 
2.1.4 The Federal Government 
The federal government engages only in inter-regional transfers.  In particular, it acquires 
part of the output purchased by the government of one region and supplies it to the 
households of the other region.  It, too, balances its budget so that: 
(8)  0 GF L GF L 2 2 1 1 = +  
where GFi is the amount of output supplied per household to the residents of region i. 
 
The amount of the government good consumed per household in region i, Gi (the variable 
which appears in the utility function), is given by: 
(9)  i i i GF GR G + =  i  =  1,2 
where  0 GR i ≥ , GFi may have either sign but Gi is assumed to be > 0.   9
 
2.1.5  Equilibrium 
There are three equilibrium conditions.  The first is that the national labour market clears: 
(10)  L L L 2 1 = +  
where L  is the national labour supply, treated as exogenous. 
 
The second governs inter-regional migration.  It is assumed that households move in 
response to inter-regional differences in utility and that such migration is costless.  This is 
a common assumption in models of this type but clearly abstracts from a range of issues, 
some of them directly related to the differences in regional government expenditure 
levels.
1   Equilibrium occurs when utility differences have disappeared so that: 
  2 1 U U = . 
using equations (1), this may be written as: 
(11) 
11 21 1 12 22 2 δδ
11 1 2 1 1 21 2 2 2 2 CCG CCG
γγ γγ ββ =  
 
Thirdly, we assume that the goods market clears in each region: 
(12)  ii 1i 1 2i 2 i i NY LC LC LG R =++   i = 1,2 
Note that only regional governments purchase output and that the federal government 
simply transfers part of this from households in one region to households in the other. 
 
The last equation of the GE model is: 
(13)  ii i i LH NF Π=Π   i = 1,2 
which states that firms in region i distribute all of their profits to households in region i. 
 
2.2 The Two-Region PEGE Model  
Relationships (1) - (13) comprise the two-region GE model.  To move to the two-region 
PEGE model we add optimisation by the regional governments.   There are various ways 
in which this might be done.  Some earlier papers have assumed that governments are 
beneficent and maximise the utility of their citizens – see, e.g., Petchey (1993), Petchey 
and Shapiro (2000, 2002) and Groenewold, Hagger and Madden (2000, 2003).  Our   10
approach here differs and is undertaken by way of contrast – we assume that regional 
governments are empire-builders (a common popular view of bureaucracies) and 
specifically that they choose their expenditure/tax combination so as to maximise the size 
of their total expenditure subject to their budget constraint and the constraints imposed by 
the structure of the economy.  We choose this objective on the argument that there is at 
least as much anecdotal evidence that regional governments behave in this way as there is 
for their beneficent behaviour.   
 







subject to the constraints imposed by the GE model of region i, including the regional 
government budget constraint. 
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.  We assume this to be the case.   
 
The PEGE model is obtained by adding (14) to the GE model and making Ti endogenous.  
The federal government is assumed to choose one of the GFi values (say GF2) with the 
second being determined via its budget constraint, equation (8).  The PEGE model thus 
consists of 27 equations, (1) to (14), in the following 27 endogenous variables: 
 U i, C1i, C2i, Gi, Pi, Mi, ΠHi, ΠFi, Wi, Li, Yi, Ti, GRi, GF1, i=1,2 
and the following four exogenous variables: 
 N i, GF2, L   i = 1,2 
We now proceed to linearise this model. 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
1 Thus, e.g., in practice land prices may differ considerably between regions and some of this difference 
may reflect the capitalised value of higher regional government expenditure.  See, e.g., Epple, Filimon and 
Romer (1984), Epple and Sieg (1999), Haughwout and Inman (2001) and Haughwout (2002).   11
3.  The Linearized Numerical Version of the Two-Region PEGE Model 
The two-region PEGE model set out in the previous section is non-linear in the levels of 
the variables.  For this reason it cannot be easily used to conduct comparative-static 
exercises which will throw light on the topic of the present paper - the regional effects of 
inter-regional federal transfers when regional governments behave as optimising agents.  
We circumvent this problem by deriving a linearized version of the model and then 
calibrating this linearized version. 
 
3.1  Linearization of the PEGE Model 
To linearize the PEGE model of section 2 we use a process of log differentiation.  By this 
means the model is converted from one which is non-linear in the variables of the model 
to one which is linear in the proportional rates of change of the variables.   
 
The linearized form of the PEGE model is: 
(1’)  i1 i 1 i2 i 2 ii i uccg =γ +γ +δ      i  =  1,2 
where lower-case letters represent the proportional changes (log differentials) of their 
upper-case counterparts. 
(2’)  im h i im w i i mh w π =σ π +σ ,     i  =  1,2 
where  mh i i i m w i i i H/ M a n d W/ M. π σ= Π σ=  
(3’)  ji i j cm - p =        i,j  =  1,2 
(4’)  ii i i y( l n ) =α − ,      i  =  1,2 
(5’)  πfi = σπfyi(pi + yi) - σπfwi(wi + li - ni +σtiti)    i = 1,2 
where σπfyi = PiYi / ΠFi,  σπfwi = [Wi(Li/Ni)(1+Ti)] / ΠFi,  σti = Ti / (1+Ti) 
(6’)  ( ) ( )
i ii i i t ii i α 1l w p σ t α 1n −− + − =−  i = 1,2 
(7’)   gri =wi + ti - pi  i = 1,2 
(8’)  2 2 1 1 gf l gf l + = +   
(9’) gi = σggrigri + σggfigfi   i = 1,2 
where σggri = GRi/Gi, σggfi = GFi/Gi. 
(10’)  l l σ l σ 2 2 1 1 = + A A   
where  () 2 1 i i i L L / L L / L σ + = ≡ A  
(11’) u1 = u2   12
(12’) ni + yi = σyci1(l1 + ci1) + σyci2(l2 + ci2) + σygri(li + gri), i = 1,2 
where σycij=LjCij/NiYi, σygri=LiGRi/NiYi 
(13’) li + πhi = ni + πfi,      i  =  1,2 
(14’) li = gri         i  =  1,2 
  
Equations (1´)-(14´) constitute a linear system in the 27 endogenous variables: ui,  cij, gi, 
mi, πhi, li, wi, pi, πfi, yi, ti, gri and gf2 and the 4 exogenous variables: ni, gf1 and l.  
 
 
3.2 Numerical Version of the Linearized PEGE Model 
We now put the linearized PEGE model of section 2 into numerical form by evaluating 
the various coefficients which appear there.   
 
Six numerical versions are constructed.  Australia has six states.  The states are New 
South Wales (NSW), Victoria (Vic), Queensland (Qld), South Australia (SA), Western 
Australia (WA), Tasmania (Tas).  One of the six numerical versions has NSW as region 1 
and the rest of the country (ROC) as region 2, a second has Vic as region 1 and ROC as 
region 2 and so on for each of the other four states.   
 
The linearized model contains a number of parameters which have to be evaluated: αi, γij, 
δi,  σmπhi, σmwi, σπfyi, σπfwi, σti, σggri, σggfi, σycij, σygri and σli.  These parameters fall into two 
groups.  The first three appear in model relationships; γij and δi appear in the utility 
function (1) and αi in the production function (4).  The remainder, on the other hand, are 
linearization parameters. 
 
The model parameters can be evaluated with the help of model restrictions and 
appropriate past information on model aggregates.  Start with αi.  Using the firm’s first-
order condition for profit-maximisation and the product-market clearing condition, (6) 
and (12) we can write αi as: 
  ( ) iii i
i
1i 1 2i 2 i i
(W /P)L 1 T




,  i = 1,2   13
This expression can be used to evaluate αi for NSW as region 1 and ROC as region 2 
given a figure for each WiLi/Pi, Ti, Li, Cij and GRi for NSW and each of the other five 
states, i.e. given these figures for all six states; and similarly for the other five versions. 
 
Turn now to γij and δi.  Here we follow the approach conventionally adopted by CGE 
modellers and calibrate the utility function to ensure that the initial solution is one of 
utility maximisation.
2  Since the relative price of C and G is unity, utility maximisation 
and the restriction that γ1i + γ2i + δi = 1 implies that:  
  γji = Cji/(C1i + C2i + Gi) ,  i,j = 1,2   
and  
  δi = Gi/(C1i + C2i + Gi),   i = 1,2 
The linearization parameters can be evaluated directly from their definitions, as presented 
in section 3, given values for the model aggregates involved for each of the six states.  To 
evaluate the linearization parameters we need values for Ti, GRi, GFi, Gi, Cij, Wi, Yi, ΠFi, 
ΠFi, Mi and Li.  We assume that Pi and Ni are unity for the base period, use data for Cji, 
GRi, GFi, Wi and Li and the model constraints to calculate Ti, Gi, Yi, ΠFi, ΠHi and Mi, 
thus ensuring that the parameter values are consistent with the constraints.  The figures 
we use for the aggregates which appear in these constraints are the average values for the 
years 1994-95 to 1998-99 and are set out in Appendix A. 
 
4. Simulations with Numerical Versions of the Linearized PEGE Model 
In this section we discuss six comparative-static simulations with the PEGE model in its 
numerical linearized form.  In each simulation we choose one of the six states to be 
region 1 and the rest of the country to be region 2 and examine the effects of an increase 
in the federal government’s transfer from the rest of the country to region 1.  In this way 
we throw light on the topic of the present paper - the regional effects of inter-regional 
federal transfers when regional governments behave as optimizing agents. 
 
4.1 Determination of the Shock 
For each simulation we shocked GF2 by choosing a non-zero value for gf2 (the 
proportional change in GF2) and setting the changes in the remaining exogenous variables 
                                                 
2 It should be noted that, while this parameterisation is conventional, it is not strictly implied by our model 
specification since there households maximise utility subject to a given level of G.    14
at zero.  In each case we chose a shock large enough to ensure perceptible results but not 
so large as to be implausible from an historical perspective.  The size of gf2 was chosen so 
that the resulting increase in the per capita transfer to region 1 amounted to 10% of the 
average absolute per capita transfer for all regions over the five-year base period.
3  The 
average per capita transfer was calculated at  $3226.20 so that the percentage change in 
GF2 was set to ensure a rise in GF1 of $322.62 in each simulation.  Given that the net 
transfer per capita varies considerably across states (some being positive and some 
negative since the population-weighted transfers sum to zero), the percentage changes in 
gf2 vary in both sign and magnitude across states.   
 
We assume that, for whatever reason, the federal government undertakes this policy in 
order to improve the welfare of the residents of region 1, if necessary at the expense of 
the welfare of those living in region 2.
4 
 
4.2 Results of Simulations with the PEGE Model 
Results for the six simulations carried out with the PEGE model in its numerical 
linearised form are shown in Table 1.   
[Table 1 about here] 
 
4.2.1 Utility 
From the standpoint of the present paper, the most important result shown in Table 1 is 
that in three of the six cases (where the recipient regions are NSW, Vic and WA) the final 
change in utility is positive in both regions and in the other three negative in both regions.  
In other words, in three simulations the federal-government transfer is Pareto-improving 
while in the other three the reverse is the case.  This result confirms the conclusion 
                                                 
3 It is recognised that a 10% change may be considered a “large” change which violates the small change 
assumption on which the linearisation is often considered to be based.  It should be noted, though, that it is 
10% of a net transfer which is itself relatively small – thus $322.62 is less than 5% of average per capita 
regional government expenditure and less than 1% of average per capita consumption expenditure.   
Moreover and more importantly, in the present context, the size of the shock is not a matter of concern – the 
purpose of the present exercise is not to evaluate a particular policy proposal which involves a 10% shock 
but simply to explore the properties of the model.  If the reader prefers a 1% shock, the results can simply  
be divided by 10 and similarly for smaller changes than 1%. 
4 Note that while the regional governments are assumed to behave in a purposeful fashion, the behaviour of 
the federal government is not explicitly modelled.  While this is clearly unsatisfactory, it seems a reasonable 
first step.  Alternatives, however, are possible – see an interesting recent paper by Borck and Owings (2003) 
where intergovernmental grants are the outcome of inter-governmental lobbying activity.   15
reached in Petchey (1995) from a two-region analytical model that efficiency-enhancing  
federal-government redistributive transfers are a definite possibility. 
 
A second noteworthy result shown in Table 1 is that, whether or not the federal-
government transfer is Pareto-efficient, the ultimate effect of the transfer on utility is 
trivial – a transfer which induces a 5% change in per capita government expenditure 
results in a final change in utility of no more than one fiftieth of 1% and in most cases 
considerably less.  This is not because the shock is trivial – the change in initial utility 
(before any of the endogenous variables have had a chance to react) in about 0.75% – but 
because of the offsetting effects of the subsequent changes in endogenous variables.   
Indeed, while the while the results set out in Table 1 suggest that federal-government 
redistributive transfers have only a small effect on welfare, they also suggest that the 
effect on other variables of interest is considerable and we now turn to these effects. 
 
4.2.2 Government Expenditure and the Rate of Payroll Tax 
It will be seen from Table 1 that in all six simulations both per capita government 
expenditure and the rate of payroll tax fall substantially in the donor region in response to 
the change in the federal government grant.  On the other hand, both rise substantially in 
the recipient region.  The rise in per capita government expenditure ranges from just over 
3% when Tasmania is the recipient region to nearly 1.5% in the Victorian case.  As for 
the rate of payroll tax, the rise ranges from nearly 1.2 percent when NSW is the recipient 
region to close to 2% in the WA case.   
 
This somewhat surprising result may be explained as follows.  Recall that each regional 
government sets its rate of payroll tax so as to maximise its total expenditures.   
Proceeding in this way, it faces two conflicting effects of a tax-rate increase.  On the one 
hand, by increasing the tax rate it will increase employment costs and so reduce 
employment and the number of households in the region.  Given expenditure per capita, 
this will mean a lower total expenditure.  On the other hand, by increasing its tax rate it 
will loosen its budget constraint and so be able to increase expenditure per capita which 
will increase total expenditure for a given number of households.  At the optimal position 
the regional government be setting its tax rate so that the effects on its total expenditure of 
these two opposing effects of a higher tax rate are in balance. 
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This will be the situation in the recipient region prior to the federal-government transfer 
to the region.  When the transfer occurs utility is now higher in the recipient region with 
the result that population is drawn into the recipient region.  This upsets the balance 
between GR and L in favour of L and allows the regional government to increase T and 
so GR until optimality is restored. 
 
4.2.3 Employment and Output 
The immediate effect of the federal-government redistributive transfer is an increase in 
the consumption of the government good in the recipient region and a decrease in the 
donor region.  Hence the immediate effect is to increase utility in the recipient region and 
to decrease it in the donor region as shown by the figures in the “initial-u” rows of Tables 
1.  However, the utilities were equal in the two regions before the transfer occurred. It 
follows, therefore, that the immediate effect of the transfer is that individuals in the donor 
region find that they can improve welfare by migrating to the recipient region. 
 
The inter-regional migration process thus begun continues until equality between utility 
in the two regions is re-established and has the result of expanding the labour force 
(equals employment) in the recipient region and reducing the labour force in the donor 
region.  Since the national labour force is exogenous and is held fixed the increase in the 
labour force of the recipient region is numerically the same as the decrease in the labour 
force in the donor region. 
 
The results for output shown in Table 1 are also of interest.   As expected from the results 
for labour, the results for output show that, for all the simulations, output increases in 
region 1 and falls in region 2.  However, the percentage increase in region 1 is, in all 
cases, smaller for output than it is for employment while the percentage decrease for 
region 2 is, in all cases, larger for output than it is for employment. 
 
Given the results for labour and output, consistency requires that the results for output per 
capita show output per capita falling for region 1 and rising in region 2 in response to the 
federal-government redistributive transfer.  This the results do, in fact, show for all six 
simulations in the “ypci” rows.  It should be noted that results for output and output per 
capita simply reflect the assumption that marginal product of labour is positive but 
declining so that average product also declines as employment increases.   17
 
A final point regarding the output results is that given the output changes for the 
individual regions the sign of the change in output for the country as a whole is 
ambiguous – it is positive for two cases and negative for the remaining four as shown in 
the “y” row of Table 1.    Since inter-regional migration results in the re-allocation of 
labour from region 1 to region 2 in all simulations, the effect of the transfer on national 
output depends simply on the relative marginal products of labour in the initial 
equilibrium.  In our model the initial marginal product of labour is equal to real unit 
labour cost (including the payroll tax).  In the case where NSW is region 1, region 1’s 
marginal product of labour (MPL1) is $40,061 while MPL2 is $35, 805 so that a shift of 
employment from region 2 to region 1 increases national output as shown while for the 
case where Qld is region 1, for example, MPL1 is $33,463 while MPL2 is $38,161 so that 
the migration of labour from region 1 to region 2 induced by the transfer reduces national 
output. 
 
4.2.4 Prices and Inter-Regional Trade 
The results shown in Table 1 indicate that substantial price changes are also likely to 
result from a federal-government redistributive transfer.  In all six simulations the 
recipient region enjoys a substantial price fall of between 1 and 2 percent while the donor 
region suffers a price rise of less than 1 percent.  Table 1 shows that associated with these 
price changes are substantial changes in inter-regional trade.  By adding the entries in the 
rows for c21 and l1 we get the percentage change in total imports by the recipient region 
from the donor region consequent on the transfer.  Similarly, by adding the entries for c12 
and l2 we get the percentage change in total exports of the recipient region to the donor 
region.  Since the model is calibrated so as to ensure balance of trade in the initial 
equilibrium, the difference between the percentage change in exports and imports gives 
the sign of the change in the balance of trade. 
 
Proceeding in this way, we find from Table 1 that when NSW is the recipient region total 
exports rise by 1.7% while total imports fall by 1.6% resulting in a substantial 
improvement in the inter-regional balance of trade from the perspective of region 1 and a 
deterioration from region 2’s perspective.  Much the same effects is generated in the case 
of the other five simulations. 
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These effects may be rationalised as follows.  The fall in output per capita in the recipient 
region described in sub-section 4.2.3 results in a fall in wages and per capita profit 
distributions and so in real income for the representative household in region 1.  Given 
the demand function, this results in a fall in consumption per capita in region 1 of  both 
goods.  Similarly, there is a rise in consumption per household in region 2.  Thus, from 
the perspective of region 1, imports fall and exports rise and vice versa for region 2.  The 
decrease in demand for good 1 and the increase in the supply of good 1 results in excess 
supply and thus a price fall while the opposite is the case for good 2 – excess demand 
drives the price up. 
 
4.2.5 The Effect of Regional-Government Optimisation 
The PEGE model used to carry out the six simulation whose results are reported in Table 
1 assumed that regional governments choose their rate of payroll tax so as to maximise 
their total expenditure.  Thus the governments are assumed to be empire-building 
optimisers.  An important question is whether the results in Table 1 are significantly 
dependent in this assumption.  Light can be thrown on this question by comparing the 
results in Table 1 with those obtained from a simulation in which regional government 
behaviour is assumed exogenous.  This simulation is based on a model identical to the 
one underlying the results in Table 1 but with equation (14’) replaced by  
(14”) gri = 0 
so that the GRi is effectively exogenous and Ti is determined to satisfy the regional 
government budget constraint.  The results of such a simulation for the case where NSW 
is region 1 are reported in the GE columns of Table 2, with the results for the PEGE 
model (taken from Table 1) reported in the PEGE columns to facilitate comparison.
5 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
The results reported in Table 2 have several interesting features.  In the first place, none 
of the signs are different between the two cases.  In this sense the results resorted in Table 
1 are not crucially dependent on the assumption of empire-building regional governments.   
 
                                                 
5 Given the similarity of the results for the six different simulations in Table 1, we report only the results for 
one simulation in Table 2.   19
The second is that welfare effects of the federal transfer are larger when regional 
governments do not react – in this particular simulation the empire-building activities of 
regional governments actually make their citizens worse-off.   
 
Third, generally the absolute values of the effects of the federal-government transfer are 
larger when regional governments do not react.  Thus, in general, the regional 
governments’ actions in the PEGE model do not affect the sign but tend to dampen the 
magnitude of the effects of the federal transfer. In this simulation, national output 
expands by less and welfare increases by less as a result of the regional governments’ 
actions and in this sense the regional governments’ behaviour is not in their citizens’ 
interest.  However, in a case where welfare falls as a results of the federal transfer, such 
as when Qld is region 1, the empire-building activities of the regional government 
dampens the welfare loss and thus can be said to benefit the citizens of both regions. 
 
5.  Conclusion 
In this paper we have set out to analyse the effects of inter-regional transfers made by a 
federal government.  We have done so with the help of a model in which each regional 
government determines its tax policy so as to maximise the level of its expenditure in the 
region subject to the constraints imposed by the economic structure of its region.  Each 
regional government is assumed to take the other regional government’s tax policy as 
given in carrying out its maximisation.  
 
We conducted a series of six simulations with a linearized version of the model after 
calibration using Australian data.  The shock was an increase in the federal government’s 
grant to region 1 matched by a decrease to its grant to region 2.  In each simulation one of 
the six Australian states was taken as region 1 and the rest of the country as region 2.   
 
We found that substantial changes in the amount transferred by the federal government 
from one region to the other have significant initial effects on utility but that once 
households are permitted to adjust their consumption patterns and to migrate from one 
region to another in response to inter-regional utility differentials, the result is to 
substantially remove these welfare effects.  We found that the changes in transfers result 
in significant changes in per capita consumption, output, prices, government expenditure, 
wages and tax rates.  The initial increase in welfare in the recipient region leads to an   20
influx of people from the other region, increasing output but reducing productivity and 
wages. The regional government in the recipient region responds to the increase in 
population by increasing both its tax rate and expenditure level so that in the new 
equilibrium employment, taxes, output and government expenditure are all higher but 
prices, wages, consumption and output per capita are all lower.  Welfare may be higher or 
lower depending on whether the initial level of government expenditure was above or 
below the welfare-maximising level. 
 
The empire-building activity of regional governments was seen to dampen the magnitude 
of changes resulting from the federal-government transfer but not to alter the sign of the 
effects either on welfare or any of the other variables of interest.  21
Table 1 
Results of Simulations with a Shock to GF2  
NSW as region 1  Vic as region 1  Qld as region 1  SA as region 1  WA as region 1  Tas as region 1 
Variable  % $p.c. % $p.c. % $p.c. % $p.c. % $p.c. % $p.c. 
m1  -1.8103 -724.68 -2.1393 -816.21 -2.2430 -798.82 -1.9739 -707.44 -2.7967 -971.34 -1.6425 -595.72
m2  0.9420 344.03 0.7435 279.44 0.5258 201.00 0.1710 64.78 0.3284  125.03 0.0403 15.23
p1  -1.2147 NA  -1.4849 NA -1.5216 NA -1.3520 NA -1.9577 NA -1.0789 NA
p2  0.6010 NA  0.5013 NA 0.3715 NA 0.1228 NA 0.2362 NA 0.0291 NA
t1  1.1759 NA  1.3663 NA 1.5031 NA 1.3348 NA 1.8254 NA 1.1900 NA
t2  -0.6353 NA  -0.4917 NA -0.3383 NA -0.1095 NA -0.2106 NA -0.0258 NA
w1  -1.5531 -510.38 -1.8692 -585.19 -2.0068 -546.03 -1.8014 -500.39 -2.5215 -716.71 -1.5371 -405.01
w2  0.7968 231.46 0.6525 195.97 0.4715 146.65 0.1554 47.53 0.2994 91.56 0.0368 11.21
y1  0.7104 940.90 0.8313 778.00 0.8136 526.28 0.7208 203.60 1.0724 384.73 0.5706  50.51
y2  -0.3637 -840.95 -0.2829 -764.28 -0.2007 -600.16 -0.0644 -215.87 -0.1229 -402.81 -0.0151  -53.70
c11  -0.5957 -190.75 -0.6544 -199.75 -0.7215 -205.56 -0.6218 -178.29 -0.8390 -233.12 -0.5635 -163.51
c21  -2.4114 -193.06 -2.6406 -201.49 -2.6145 -186.22 -2.0967 -150.29 -3.0329 -210.68 -1.6716 -121.26
c12  2.1567 90.62  2.2284 58.96 2.0474 34.12 1.5230 9.48 2.2860  18.56 1.1193 2.01
c22  0.3410 110.20 0.2423  84.64 0.1544  56.43 0.0482 17.95 0.0922 34.34 0.0112  4.22
gr1  0.8375 60.29  0.9820 63.40 1.0179 63.65 0.8854 66.71 1.2615 92.61 0.7318 64.11
gr2  -0.4395 -29.69  -0.3405 -24.06 -0.2382 -16.82 -0.0769  -5.27 -0.1475 -10.11 -0.0181  -1.24
initial-u1  0.6841 NA  0.7286 NA 0.7716 NA 0.7227 NA 0.7751 NA 0.6767 NA
initial-u2  -0.3881 NA  -0.2419 NA -0.1659 NA -0.0684 NA -0.0808 NA -0.0205 NA
u1  0.0070 NA  0.0221 NA -0.0035 NA -0.0142 NA 0.0122 NA -0.0069 NA
u2  0.0070 NA  0.0221 NA -0.0035 NA -0.0142 NA 0.0122 NA -0.0069 NA
l1  0.8375 23487  0.9820 20601 1.0179 15727 0.8854  5766 1.2615 10757 0.7318  1439
l2  -0.4395 -23487  -0.3405 -20601 -0.2382 -15727 -0.0769  -5766 -0.1475 -10757 -0.0181  -1439
gf1  NA 323.15  NA 326.84 NA 323.29 NA 309.97 NA 328.83 NA 302.50
gf2  NA  -169.14  NA  -111.83 NA -75.49 NA -27.99 NA -37.69 NA  -7.97
g1  5.3774 383.44 6.3670 390.25 6.2412 386.94 4.2789 376.69 6.1151 421.44 3.2154 366.61
g2  -2.9278  -198.83  -1.8931  -135.89 -1.3050 -92.31 -0.4932 -33.26 -0.6919 -47.81 -0.1355  -9.21
y  0.0275 12.27  0.0038  1.68 -0.0203 -9.07 -0.0034 -1.51 -0.0050 -2.22 -0.0009 -0.39
ypc1  -0.1271 -60.04  -0.1507 -67.22 -0.2043 -85.54 -0.1646 -71.39 -0.1892 -79.58 -0.1613 -72.61
ypc2  0.0759 32.84  0.0576 25.70 0.0375 16.97 0.0126 5.62 0.0246  11.05 0.0030 1.32 22
 
Notes: 
1. Variables are defined as follows: 
mi = proportional change in per capita nominal income region i, 
pi = proportional change in the price of output produced in region i, 
ti = payroll tax rate in region i, 
wi = proportional change in the nominal wage rate in region i, 
yi = proportional change in out put region i; the $ per capita figure in the second column is simply the proportional change applied to base value of output per capita, 
  and so is not the change in per capita output (which is given later in the table as ypci), 
cij = proportional change in per capita real consumption of good i (produced in region i) by residents of region j, 
gri = proportional change in real per capita expenditure by regional government i, 
initial-ui = the effect on Ui of the change to GFi with all other variables held constant, 
ui = proportional change in utility of the representative household in region i, 
li = proportional change in employment (= labour force = population) region i, 
gfi = proportional change in per capita provision of federal government goods, region i, 
gi = proportional change in per capita real government goods provided to residents of region i, 
y = proportional change in real output for the economy as a whole (both total and per capita since economy-wide population is fixed), and 
ypci =  proportional change in real output per capita, region i. 
2. All the figures in the $p.c. columns are $ per capita (some real and some nominal; see definitions of the variables) except for l which is persons and y which is $ millions. 
3. The “NA” in the $pc columns for pi, ti and ui imply that these are not applicable for these variables since none of them is measured in $ per capita.  The “NA” in the $pc 
column for gfi reflects the fact that the gf shock was chosen such as to ensure that the initial change in GF1 was $232.62; the corresponding % figures vary widely in sign and 
magnitude reflecting the variation in the base values and have no meaning in themselves.   23
Table 2: The Effects of Regional Government Optimisation  
(NSW as region 1) 
PEGE GE 
Variable  % $p.c. % $p.c. 
m1  -1.8103 -724.68 -1.8288 -732.06
m2  0.9420 344.03 0.9754 356.24
p1  -1.2147 NA -1.4678 NA
p2  0.6010 NA 0.7609 NA
t1  1.1759 NA 0.2937 NA
t2  -0.6353 NA -0.1773 NA
w1  -1.5531 -510.38 -1.7615 -578.85
w2  0.7968 231.46 0.9381 272.53
y1  0.7104 940.90 1.3465 1783.48
y2  -0.3637 -840.95 -0.6893 -1594.02
c11  -0.5957 -190.75 -0.3610 -115.61
c21  -2.4114 -193.06 -2.5896 -207.33
c12  2.1567 90.62 2.4432 102.66
c22  0.3410 110.20 0.2146 69.35
gr1  0.8375 60.29 0.0000 0.00
gr2  -0.4395 -29.69 0.0000 0.00
initial-u1  0.6841 NA 0.6841 NA
initial-u2  -0.3881 NA -0.3881 NA
u1  0.0070 NA 0.0087 NA
u2  0.0070 NA 0.0087 NA
l1  0.8375 23487 1.5874 44519.38
l2  -0.4395 -23487 -0.8332 -44519.38
gf1  NA 323.15 NA 323.93
gf2  NA -169.14 NA -169.14
g1  5.3774 383.44 4.5429 323.93
g2  -2.9278 -198.83 -2.4906 -169.14
y 0.0275 12.27 0.0521 23.25
ypc1  -0.1271 -60.04 -0.2410 -113.80
ypc2  0.0759 32.84 0.1438 62.25
Notes: variables definitions: see notes to Table 1. PEGE refers to the model with optimising regional 




  Total  corresponding  to       
 C  ($m)  GR  ($m)  LW ($m)  GF ($m)  W ($’000)  L ( ‘000)  Y/L ($’000) 
Region  1  NSW  112265.4 20189.8 92160.8  -192.3 32.8618  2804.5 47.2295 
Region  2  ROC  195152.8 36096.6 15227.8  192.3 29.0498  5343.5 43.2768 
Nation 307418.2  56286.4  247388.6  0.0  30.3619  8148  44.6373 
Region  1  Vic  80040.8 13545.4 65680.6  -686.9 31.3078  2097.9 44.6095 
Region 2 ROC  227377.4  42741  181708  686.9  30.0339  6050.1  44.6469 
Nation 307418.2  56286.4  247388.6  0.0  30.3619  8148  44.6373 
Region  1  Qld  55026  9662.6 42041.6  -83.3 27.2096  1545.1 41.8669 
Region 2 ROC  252392.2  46623.8  205347  83.3  31.0995  6602.9  45.2856 
Nation 307418.2  56286.4  247388.6  0.0  30.3619  8148  44.6373 
Region  1  SA  23339.2  4906.8  18088.6 826.0  27.7773 651.2  43.3753 
Region 2 ROC  284079  51379.6  229300  -826.0  30.5864  7496.8  44.7469 
Nation 307418.2  56286.4  247388.6  0.0  30.3619  8148  44.6373 
Region  1  WA  29616  6259.6 24236.8  -383.0 28.4236  852.7 42.0729 
Region 2 ROC  277802.2  50026.8  223151.8  383.0  30.5884  7295.3  44.9370 
Nation 307418.2  56286.4  247388.6  0.0  30.3619  8148  44.6373 
Region  1  Tas  7130.8  1722.2  5180.2 519.4  26.3489 196.6  45.0305 
Region 2 ROC  300287.4  54564.2  242208.4  -519.4  30.4611  7951.4  44.6276 
Nation 307418.2  56286.4  247388.6  0.0  30.3619  8148  44.6373 
  Sources:  Ci, Li, LWi and GRi are from ABS times series averaged over the period 1994/95 - 1998/99.  Time-series data on interstate imports are not reported by 
the ABS so that in each case C11 was set at 80% of C1 and C21 at 20% of C1.  C12 was then chosen to ensure a zero balance of trade in the initial equilibrium and 
C22 was chosen as C2 – C12.  GFi is computed as Li (MGFi/Li - MGF/L) where MGFi is final consumption expenditure by the federal government plus grants to 
state i.  All other data are calculated from these figures to ensure that the model constraints hold:  L = L1 + L2, Wi = WiLi/Li, Yi = GRi + Ci, Gi = GRi+GFi, Ti = 
GRi/WiLi.  It should be noted that, as the model excludes investment and net overseas exports, Yi will not conform with official figures.  Pi was set at 1 for each i 
in the initial equilibrium.   25
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